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WORTHLESS CHECK TRANSACTIONS: REM. REV. STAT.
2129, SECTIONS 23 AND 24 OF THE UNIFORM SALES ACT,
THE MOTOR VEHICLE REGISTRATION ACT
JAMES M. DOLLIVER
Recently the Washington Supreme Court considered two cases in-
volving the exchange of goods for a worthless check with a subsequent
sale to a bona fide purchaser.1 In the first case the Court found for the
bona fide purchaser while in the later case the original owner prevailed.
Fairness to the Court compels the statement that the reason for this
surprising reversal was not mere caprice but seemed rather to stem
from a little used statute passed in 1854, the construction of which
was controlling in each opinion. The pertinent portion of the statute in
question, Rem. Rev. Stat. § 2129,2 reads as follows:
Restoration of Stolen Property-Duty of Officer. All property obtained
by larceny, robbery, or burglary, shall be restored to the owner; and no
sale, whether in good faith on the part of the purchaser or not, shall divest
the owner of his rights to such property....
Whatever may have been the purpose of the 1854 territorial legislators,
the chief impact of the statute has been in the field of worthless check
sales.
The objective of this article is to examine Section 2129 as it has
been construed by the Court and as other legal doctrines pertain to it,
and attempt to evaluate the validity of the Court's current approach
to it. Since the primary application of the statute has been in the area
of worthless check transactions, there will be a discussion of the rela-
tionship of Section 2129 to the Uniform Sales Act' and an examination
of the problems raised in Hutson v. Walker' and Richardson v. Seattle-
First National Bank' vis-d-vis the motor vehicle ownership and regis-
tration statutes.
To date the Court has construed Section 2129 seven times,' but only
I Hutson v. Walker, 37 Wn. 2d 12, 221 P. 2d 506 (1950) ; Richardson v. Seattle-
First National Bank, 138 Wash. Dec. 298, 229 P. 2d 341 (1951).
2 [P.P.C. § 112-97].
s REm. REv. STAT. § 5836-1 to 5836-79 [P.P.C. § 851-1 to 869-9].
4 Note 1 supra.
5Note 1 supra.
" Linn v. Reid, 114 Wash. 609, 196 Pac. 13 (1921) ; Harris v. Northwest Motors
Co., 116 Wash. 412, 199 Pac. 992 (1921) ; Keck v. Yakima Savings and Loan Associ-
ation, 160 Wash. 430, 295 Pac. 483 (1931) ; Rosenkranz v. Guaranty Trust Co.,- 160
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Linn v. Reid,7 Frye & Co. v. Boltman,8 Hutson v. Walker,' and Rich-
ardson v. Seattle-First National Bank"0 have relevance to the worthless
check situation. In the Linn case, P traded his car to X and Y for a
car stolen by them. X and Y sold P's car to D, a bona fide purchaser.
The Court, in finding for D, held that X and Y had obtained the car
by false pretenses, and since such an offense was not included in the
word "larceny" as used in Section 2129, this statute did not apply and
the bona fide purchaser would be protected." In reaching this con-
clusion, the Court reasoned that since at the time of the passage of
Section 2129,12 obtaining property by false pretenses was not included
in the statutory definition of larceny and was not considered to be
larceny," property obtained by larceny would come under Section
2129 only if the act of obtaining was considered to be larceny in 1854.
This result was reached even though the Criminal Code of 1909'" in-
cluded the crime of obtaining property by false pretenses in the lar-
ceny statute.'5
The next occasion on which the Court considered Section 2129 was
in Frye & Co. v. Boltman.'8 This case concerned the sale of a team of
horses to X who posed as one M. After giving a worthless check to P
and receiving the horses in exchange, X sold the horses to D, a bona
fide purchaser. Here the Court decided the facts showed an obtaining
by false personation, which in 1854 was made statutory larceny, and
therefore Section 2129, under the construction given it by the Linn
case, was held applicable. After finding for the original owner, the
Wash. 548, 295 Pac. 487 (1931) ; Frye & Co. v. Boltman, 182 Wash. 447, 47 P. 2d
839 (1935); Hutson v. Walker, 37 Wn. 2d 12, 221 P. 2d 506 (1950); Richardson v.
Seattle-First National Bank 138 Wash. Dec. 298, 229 P. 2d 341 (1951).
7114 Wash. 609, 196 Pac. 13 (1921).
8 182 Wash. 447, 47 P. 2d 839 (1935).
0 37 Wn. 2d 12, 221 P. 2d 506 (1950).
10 138 Wash. Dec. 298, 229 P. 2d 341 (1951).
21 "It [P's car] was voluntarily surrendered by respondent [P] who parted with
possession of it with the intent to pass title to the wrongdoers, thus giving them
all the indicia of ownership and the apparent right of disposal. Under such circum-
stances, in the absence of a statutory rule to the contrary, a bona fide purchaser from
the vendee will be protected. It is but the enforcement of the old and familiar rule
that, of two innocent persons, one of whom must suffer by the fraud of a third person,
he who has put it in the power of such third person to commit the fraud must be the
sufferer." Linn v. Reid, 114 Wash. 609 at 611, 196 Pac. 13 at 14 (1921).
2Wash. Laws 1854, c. 3, § 51.
"3 Wash. Laws 1854, c. 3, §§ 45, 46, 53, 54, 55.
24 Wash. Laws 1909, c. 249, § 349.
'5 "To extend the intention of the legislators of 1854, as expressed in its statute,§ 51, p. 84 (now Rem. Code, § 2129), and to engraft it into this new kind of larceny,
which that legislature negatively refused to do, would be an unwarranted extension of
the manifest intention of the legislature, under the guise of judicial interpretation."
Linn v. Reid, 114 Wash. 609 at 617, 196 Pac. 13 at 16 (1921).
16 Note 8 supra.
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Court indicated by a gratuitous dictum that an owner might ". . . by
acts amounting to an equitable estoppel place himself in a position
where he cannot enforce his legal title," but concluded that there was
"... nothing in the facts of this case which even approaches equitable
estoppel."1
Section 2129 lay dormant until 1950 when Hutson v. Walker i" came
before the Court. Here P transferred his automobile, along with a bill
of sale, certificate of registration, and the certificate of title indorsed
in blank, to one Lee, who, representing himself to be a salesman for
an automobile dealer, paid for the car with a forged check. That same
day, Lee, having filled in the bill of sale with his name, resold the car
to D, a bona fide purchaser. P sought to recover the car from D and
on appeal a judgment for D was affirmed. Here the Court disposed of
Section 2129 without difficulty, holding that since P had given Lee the
certificate of title indorsed in blank, which was in violation of statutory
procedure,19 together with possession of the car, he was ". . . estopped
by his conduct to question respondent's title to the car."2 Thus, by
using the above-quoted dictum in the Frye case, the Court justified the
estoppel of the owner claiming under Section 2129 and supported its
holding by citing with approval the doctrine of comparative innocence
set forth in the Linn opinion." It should be noted that the Court did
not discuss whether the action of Lee was obtaining by false pretenses
or obtaining by false personation or whether P intended to pass title
to Lee.
The short, happy life of the Hutson rule was abruptly terminated
by Richardson v. Seattle-First National Bank.22 Here P sold her car
to a man who gave his name as Thornton and represented himself to
be an agent of a Seattle automobile dealer. This man handed P a check
for the agreed price, with the name of the automobile dealer on it, and
P gave him the car, together with the certificate of title, indorsed in
blank. Through an intermediate party the car came into the hands of
D, whom the Court treated as a bona fide purchaser."2 In finding for
the original owner the Court, taking cognizance of Section 2129, de-
17 Id. at 450, 47 P. 2d at 840.
18 Note 9 supra.
19 REM. Supp. 1947 § 6312-6.
20 Hutson v. Walker, 37 Wn. 2d 12 at 18, 221 P. 2d 506 at 509.
21 Note 11 supra.
22 Note 10 supra.
23 Olsen, the bona fide purchaser, had financed the purchase of the car with the
Seattle-First National Bank, but by the time the case was tried the second time, Olsen
had paid in full his obligation to the bank and the bank was dismissed as a party
defendant. See page 7, appellant's brief.
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clared that since the action of "Thornton" constituted obtaining by
false personation the statute must prevail. The Court further stated
that estoppel or the doctrine of comparative innocence would be avail-
able only where ". . . the owner parted with his title under circum-
stances which would not constitute larceny, as it was defined at the
time of the enactment of Rem. Rev. Stat. 2129."24 Furthermore, the
Court felt compelled to overrule the point of estoppel in the Hutson
case to the extent that it was in conflict with the Richardson opinion.25
The Richardson case being the Court's latest word on Section 2129,
the current rule apparently is: If the worthless check transaction was
an obtaining by false pretenses or any other act not amounting to
statutory larceny in 1854, Section 2129 will not prevent an estoppel;
but if the transaction involves false personation or other acts which
were larceny in 1854, the bona fide purchaser cannot retain the goods."8
The prevailing judicial attitude favoring the bona fide purchaser
probably is due to the feeling that his protection is essential to the
free and unclogged transfer of goods in a commercial society. Extensive
use of the doctrines of estoppel and comparative innocence to protect
the bona fide purchaser attests to the truth of this observation, and
cases protecting the bona fide purchaser are legion. The construction
given Section 2129 in the Linn case and the facility with which the
Court dismissed this statute in the Hutson case are further indications
of the courts' solicitude for bona fide purchasers. This desire to afford
protection to persons in this class is carried into the Uniform Sales Act
by sections 23 and 24.2Y
Regardless of the language and intent of the Sales Act, most authori-
ties agree 8 the present majority rule is that where goods are delivered
upon the presentment of a worthless check no property interest passes
24138 Wash. Dec. 298 at 300, 229 P. 2d 341 at 343.
25 Ibid.26 But see Keck v. 'Yakima Savings and Loan Association, 160 Wash. 430, 295
Pac. 483 (1931).
27 RE . REv. STAT. § 5836-23(1), § 5836-24 [P.P.C. § 859-13(1), § 859-15].
280n the subject of worthless check transactions generally, see, VOLD, SALES 174
(1931); 2 WmLisToN, SALES (Rev. Ed. 1948) § 346; Void, Worthless Check Sales,
"Substantially Simultaneous" and conflicting analyses (1950); 1 T3HE HASTINGS
JouRNAL 110; Protection of Purchaser from One Who Acquires Goods by Giving
Bad Check-Missouri Law, 13 Mo. L. REv. 211 (1948) ; Colling, Title to Goods Paid
for with Worthless Check, 15 So. CAL. L. REv. 340 (1942) ; McCullough, Payment by
Note or Acceptance-Wzether Vendor may Recover Goods from Bona Fide Purchaser
When Check in Payment Is Dishonored, 2 C3I-KENT L. REv. 182 (1942) ; Payment
by Forged Check, Recovery of Goods by Seller from Bona Fide Purchaser, 17 TENN.
L. REv. 272 (1942) ; Markley, Right to Reclaim Delivered Goods in a Cash Sale, 26
DicKINsoN L. REv. 277 (1932) ; Effect of Payment by Check on Passage of Title,
9 CALIF. L. REv. 78 (1920).
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to the buyer and, therefore, the original owner may assert his title,
even as against an innocent purchaser.29 Such an analysis presumes the
intent of the parties is for a technical cash sale" and flies in the face
of the provisions of the Sales Act. 1 While the pre-Sales Act view was
that absent contrary intent a technical cash sale is presumed, under
the Sales Act the presumption is for an ordinary sale and that the
property in the goods passes to the buyer when the contract is made. 2
The majority iule has evoked considerable critical opposition, based
on the proposition that while the intent of the parties may have been
for the buyer to retain title until the check was cashed, such intent is
not borne out by their conduct.33 The minority reasons that the intent
of the parties being to pass title at the time of the mutual transfer of
the goods and the worthless check, the fraudulent buyer acquired a
voidable title which becomes indefeasible upon a transfer of the goods
to a bona fide purchaser. 4 Since in the absence of any worthless check
problems the courts have been willing to follow the presumption of the
Sales Act and find, in the absence of expressed intent, an ordinary sale,
there seems to be no sound logical reason why an exception should be
made in the worthless check cases.3
Even when the fraudulent buyer is found to have no title, most
courts will find for the bona fide purchaser when the owner can be
estopped from asserting his title." Mere possession of the goods by
the fraudulent buyer will not alone set up an estoppel." Generally,
29 See 2 WILLISTON, SALES (Rev. Ed. 1948) § 346a, footnote 14.
30 See VOLD, SALES 168 (1931) ; 31 A.L.R. 578; 54 A.L.R. 526; But cf. Goodwin v.
Bear, 122 Wash. 49, 209 Pac. 1080 (1922).
81 Uniform Sales Act, § 19(1), REM. REV. STAT. § 5836-19(1) [P.P.C. § 859-1];
See 2 WILISTON, SALES (Rev. Ed. 1948) § 343; VOLD, SALES 176 (1931) ; Proposed
final draft of the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, 2-401; For a discussion of the view that
under § 19(1) of the Sales Act an ordinary sale is presumed unless a contrary intention
affirmatively appears and the goods pass to the buyer when delivered and the check
given for the purchase price, see Goodlett, The Effect of Accepting a Worthless
Check Where the Parties Contemplate a Cash Sale. 28 Ky. L.J. 322 (1940).3 2 REM. REV. STAT. § 5836-19(1) [P.P.C. § 859-5(1)].
83 This situation has been called analogous to the seller extending to the buyer a
short term of credit, see 38 YALE L.J. 1154 (1929) ; 15 So. CAL. L. Rv. 340 at 346(1942) ; 28 Ky. L.J. 322 at 325 (1940), such buyer to have a voidable title which be-
comes indefeasible when goods pass to the bona fide purchaser. See 34 IowA L. REv.
371 (1949) for a suggestion that the fraudulent buyer is actually a conditional vendee
under an unrecorded conditional sale.
84 Sullivan and Co. v. Wells, 89 F. Supp. 317 (D. C. Neb. 1950) ; Nelson v. Lewis,
143 Kan. 106, 53 P. 2d 813 (1936); Parr v. Helfrich, 108 Neb. 801, 189 N.W. 281(1922). See 2 WILLISTON, op. cit., supra note 31, §§ 346a, 346b.
35 2 WILLISTON, op. cit., supra note 31 §§ 264, 343; Rockwood v. Green 179 Wash.
138, 36 P. 2d 261 (1934).
13 UNIFORM SALES ACT § 23(1), REM. REv. STAT. § 5836-23(1) [P.P.C. § 859-
5(1)].
37 J. L. McClure Motor Co. v. McClain, 34 Ala. App. 614. 42 So. 2d 266 (1949);
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there must be some apparent authority given by the seller to the
fraudulent buyer to sell,8 or more often this apparent authority is
found when the seller transfers with the goods so-called "indicia of
title"--usually documentary evidence that the possessor of the goods
has authority to transfer them." Courts frequently attempt to reinforce
their use of estoppel by concurrently citing the doctrine of "compara-
tive innocence," which finds its expression in the maxim that where
there are two innocent persons, one of whom must suffer by the fraud
of a third person, he who has put it in the power of such third person
to commit the fraud must be the sufferer.4 °
Thus far, the Washington Court has not taken a clear position on
whether a voidable title will pass in worthless check sales. A prior case
on this subject4' was decided before the passage of the Sales Act and
is sometimes cited as placing Washington with those jurisdictions
which hold that not even a voidable title passes in a worthless check
transaction. 2 A careful reading of the opinion, however, will show this
view to be in error.,3 As previously mentioned, the presumed intention
of the parties under the Sales Act is for an ordinary sale and unless a
contrary intention appears, "Where there is an unconditional contract
to sell specific goods in a deliverable state, the property in the goods
passes to the buyer when the contract is made, and it is immaterial
whether the time of payment, or the time of delivery, or both, be post-
poned."" The fact that the taking of the goods may have been wrong-
ful, fraudulent and with a felonious intent is not crucial. The important
question to ascertain is whether the taking was with the consent of the
owner. As a general rule, where possession of a chattel has been ob-
tained by theft or other criminal act which involves a taking without
the owner's consent, a bona fide purchaser does not acquire any title
as against the original owner."3 This rule, however, does not apply
Eatonville State Bank v. Marshall, 170 Wash. 503, 17 P. 2d 14 (1932); but see Linn
v. Reid, note 7 supra at 611, 196 Pac. 13 at 14 (1921).
83 Bauer v. Commercial Credit Co., 163 Wash. 210, 300 Pac. 1049 (1931); see
State Bank of Black Diamond v. Johnson 104 Wash. 550, 560 177 Pac. 340, 343 (1918).
80 Fisher v. Thumlert, 194 Wash. 70, 76 P. 2d 1018 (19385; for a collecion of cases
see 151 A.LR. 690.
4o Paulsell v. Peters, 9 Wn. 2d 599, 115 P. 2d 708 (1941); Van Norman v. Wood-
son, 182 Wash. 271, 46 P. 2d 1050 (1935) ; Kiley v. Bugge, 165 Wash. 677, 5 P. 2d
1038 (1931); Linn v. Reid, note 7 supra; Schwerter v. Hooker, 94 Wash. 642, 162
Pac. 981 (1917).
41 Quality Shingle Co. v. Old Oregon Lumber and Shingle Co., 110 Wash. 60, 187
Pac. 705 (1920).
42 2 WILLISTON, op. cit., suPra, note 31, § 346, footnote 14.
4 3See Ayer, Washington Sales Act, 2 WAsHa. L. Rav. 145 at 150 (1927).
44Rai. REv. STAT. § 5836-19(1) [P.P.C. § 859-5 (1)].
45 Lewis v. Kanters, 262 Mass. 275, 159 N.E. 617 (1928) ; Merinella v. Swartz, 123
Wash. 521, 212 Pac. 1052 (1923) ; 55 C.J. § 654.
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where the owner, although induced to part with possession and title
by a criminal act, does so voluntarily." The fact that the owner is
induced to sell by the fraud of the buyer makes the sale voidable but
not void and the sale to the bona fide purchaser is not defeated because
the fraudulent buyer assumed a false name or practiced any other
deceit to induce the vendor to sell.4"
If, then, the minority rule--the sounder rule analytically-is fol-
lowed, the ordinary worthless check transaction would give a voidable
title to such fraudulent buyer and Section 24 of the Sales Act would
apply. This section states that "Where the seller of goods has a void-
able title, but his title has not been avoided at the time of the sale, the
buyer acquires a good title to the goods, provided he buys them in
good faith, for value and without notice of the seller's defect of title."M
8
Therefore, the very transaction which under Section 2129 is forbidden
to divest the rights of the owner is sanctioned by the Sales Act, Section
24. The passage of the Sales Act would seem to render obsolete the
Court's analysis in the Linn case. By construing Section 2129 in the
light of the Sales Act, and using the better analysis, where the owner
in return for a worthless check voluntarily parts with possession and
intends to pass title to the one who hands over the check, the bona fide
purchaser should prevail. If this approach is followed, Section 2129
would be limited to those cases where, because the taking was without
the consent of the owner, not even a voidable title passes to the fraudu-
lent intermediary.4
Even assuming that the Washington Court would prefer to stay with
46 Perkins v. Anderson, 65 Iowa 398, 21 N.W. 696 (1884) ; Martin v. Green, 117
Me. 138, 102 Ati. 977 (1918) ; Cochran v. Stewart, 21 Minn. 435 (1875) ; Ross v.
Leuci, 85 N.Y.S. 2d 497 (1949); Phelps v. McQuade, 158 App. Div. 528, 143 N.Y.S.
822 (1913), aff'd 220 N.Y. 232, 115 N.E. 441 (1917) ; see Linn v. Reid, note 7 supra
at 611, 196 Pac. 13 at 14 (1921) ; see 2 WiU.isroN op. cit., supra note 31 § 625a.
4T Edmunds v. Merchant's Transportation Co., 135 Mass. 283 (1883); see 26 COL.
L. REv. 636 (1926) ; 11 CORNELL L. Q. 422 (1926).4 8 REm. REV. STAT. § 5836-24 [P.P.C. § 859-15].
49 That this was the original intent of the 1854 legislators is suggested by an
examination of the 1854 Session Laws. Larceny at common law was the obtaining
of the possession of personal property by trespass in the taking and carrying away of
same from the possession of another, with felonious intent to deprive him of his owner-
ship in the goods. MILLER, CR iMNAL LAW § 109 (1934) ; 30 YALE L.J., 613 (1921).
The rule of § 2129 has always applied to common law larceny but not to statutory
larceny where there was a voluntary surrender of the goods and both title and pos-
session were intended to pass. See Ross v. Leuci, 85 N.Y.S. 2d 497, 501 (1949). It
is suggested that § 2129 (WAsH. LAWS 1854, c. 3 § 51) was meant to be no more than
a restatement of the common law, to apply to WASH. LAws 1854 c. 3 §§ 45, 46 (which
define common law larceny), but not to §§ 53 and 55 (which made obtaining by false
personation and embezzlement, larceny). See Keck v. Yakima Savings and Loan
Association, 160 Wash. 430, 295 Pac. 483 (1931) ; 11 Cornell L. Q. 422 (1926).
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the majority and would refuse to allow even a voidable title to pass a
worthless check sale, Section 23 of the Sales Act"0 will still limit Section
2129 insofar as it concerns a bona fide purchaser. The rule that there
may be an estoppel against an owner where by his conduct he is pre-
cluded from denying the seller's authority to act has been recognized
in Washington. " The effect of Section 23, when read in conjunction
with Section 2129, would appear to be that the former adds a qualifica-
tion to the latter, viz., the original owner shall not be divested of any
rights in his property unless he "... is by his conduct precluded from
denying the seller's authority to sell."5 2 The Court in the Hutson case
recognized that the giving of the certificate of title to the car, indorsed
in blank was such conduct as to raise an estoppel. The critical point is
the act of the owner which raises the estoppel, i.e., giving the buyer
apparent authority to sell by placing the certificate of title, signed in
blank, as well as possession of the automobile in his hands.
An adoption of the above analysis under Section 24 would protect
the bona fide purchaser of goods in worthless check transactions where
the seller voluntarily gives up and intends to give up both possession
of and title to the goods to the person confronting him. However, at
least in the two most recent cases to come before the Court," the
fraudulent buyer, whatever his real or assumed name, claimed to be
the authorized agent of a reputable automobile dealer. Only a remark-
able imagination, it is submitted, would find under these circumstances
that the owner intended both possession and title to pass to the fraudu-
lent agent. Rather, it would seem, while the owner intended the agent
to have possession, title was intended to go to the automobile dealer
whom the "agent" claimed to represent. Thus, the argument based on
Section 24 would not avail the bona fide purchaser in such cases. How-
ever, there is no reason why the bona fide purchaser should not recover
under these facts by using Section 23 of the Sales Act if the owner
gave the fraudulent agent such indicia of title as to be estopped from
denying the agent's authority to sell. Section 2129 would then apply
only where the owner was not estopped from denying the false agent's
authority to sell.
Especially when the worthless check problem is related to motor
vehicles does failure to consider Section 2129, as modified by the Sales
50 R m. REV. STAT. § 5836-23(1) [P.P.C. § 859-13(1)].
5' Fisher v. Thumlert, 194 Wash. 70, 76 P. 2d 1018 (1938).52 R~m. Ray. STAT. § 5836-23(1) [P.P.C. § 859-13(1)].
-
3 Hutson v. Walker note 1 supra; Richardson v. Seattle-First National Bank note
1 supra.
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Act, run counter to other established policies. In the Hutson case, the
Court went to great lengths to spell out its reasons for estopping the
owner from recovering his property. The major reason advanced was
the owner's failure to comply with the motor vehicle ownership and
registration code.5" Failure to fill in the form on the back of the certifi-
cate of title and only indorsing it in blank was held to clothe the
fraudulent agent with such indicia of title as to estop the seller from
asserting his title against a bona fide purchaser. Reference was made
to an analogous situation in Merchants Rating and Adjusting Co. v.
Skaug," where a mortgagee of an automobile who failed to comply
with the statutory requirement of securing a new certificate of regis-
tration lost his lien as against an innocent purchaser of the car.
As to the purpose and scope of the motor vehicle registration act,
the Washington statutes apparently fall into that class which do not
clearly enough express intention to hold the certificates of registration
and title as conclusive title instruments but which certificates are
meant to serve as more than an aid to the enforcement of police regu-
lations."0 The results of the Skaug and Hutson cases indicate that while
failure to comply with the motor vehicle registration statutes will affect
the rights of third parties, the Court is not willing to construe the
certificate of ownership as a conclusive title instrument. So long as
this construction of the motor vehicle act is continued, in the ordinary
case where the owner intends to pass title and possession to the buyer
but fails to comply with the statutory procedure, the bona fide pur-
chaser should recover, under either the passage of voidable title theory
and Section 24 or the estoppel theory and Section 23. If, however, the
certificate of title was by legislative or judicial action declared to be
conclusive of title, it seems hardly possible that the theory of vesting
voidable title in the fraudulent buyer would be valid."
As to the Hlutson and Richardson cases, while it is apparent that the
bona fide purchaser in neither case should have recovered on any
theory that the owner intended to pass title, Section 23 would appear
54 REM. Supp. 1947 § 6312-6. The first paragraph of this section states, "(a) In
the event of the sale or other transfer to a new registered owner of any vehicle for
which a certificate of ownership and a certificate of license registration have been
issued, the registered and legal owners shall endorse upon the back of the certificate
of ownership an assignment thereof in form printed thereon, and deliver the same to
the purchaser or transferee at the time of the delivery to him of the said vehicle."
r5 4 Wn. 2d 46, 102 P. 2d 277 (1940).
56 See Davis, The Motor Vehicle Registration Act as a Limitation on the Chattel
Mortgage Recording Act, 15 WASHa. L. REv. 182 (1940).
57 See 2 BAYLOR L. REV. 97 (1949).
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to apply in both instances. Considered alone, Section 2129 might
control and the Court's use of the 1854 definitions of obtaining by false
personation and obtaining by false pretenses plus its rejection of
estoppel in the Richardson case might be valid. However, the doctrine
of estoppel has now been sanctioned by statute in Section 23 and since
failure to properly fill out the back of the certificate of title was held
sufficient to estop the owner from asserting title in the Hutson case, the
same doctrine should have been applied in the Richardson case.
